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Consistency inside of an organization is vital to the success of the organization. Many
actions are taken in order to increase consistency and standardization especially in service
industries such as hospitality. The purpose of the mission statement and goals is to
disseminate the vision throughout the business; this way even the lowest level employee
can know where the business is heading and “buy in” to the vision. Consistency can
create synergies within the company allowing it to be more successful. In the absence of
the consistent attributes and practices, a company will ultimately fail for lack of vision.
This lack of consistency brings up interesting complications for an organization that
chooses franchising as a business model. Franchising benefits from economies of scale
form large systems and localized small locations. Some of these benefits of franchising
can in many circumstances are the downfall of the company’s brand image. With more
growth it becomes more and more difficult to insure that consistency is being maintained.
While franchisors have a method of monitoring franchisees, it is almost impossible and
certainly not cost effective to monitor that location 100% of the time.
Many companies may decide to not only franchise but also own locations. Onsite
managers are employed by the company and operate the company owned locations. This
differs from their franchised locations where franchisees employ the staff that manages
the location. The company has much more influence over the day to day operations of the
company owned locations and then must rely on the franchisees to maintain standards
and the brand image.
The purpose of this study will be to try to determine if the company can produce
consistency throughout its organization by looking at restaurant inspection scores. This
study will look at the large franchised restaurant company, Sonic Drive In. While there
are many areas that a company must be consistent in, a plethora of studies have been
conducted showing that cleanliness is directly related to customer satisfaction. By
looking at food safety inspection scores of both franchised and company owned
locations, we will determine if the company is adequately monitoring all of its locations.
Standardization and Image Consistency
One great motivator for a business to standardize its practices and present a consistent
image is it can lead to a greater market share through loyalty. Loyalty can be attained
through consistency because consistency leads to trust in the company (Macintosh and
Lockshin, 1997). Trust is “one party’s confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability and
integrity” (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) which simple means trust is built through
consistency. Units must depend on each, because their success is predicated on the
customer’s desire for a common experience (Michael, 2002). Customer’s experience is an

important source of image consistency (Kaufmann and Eroglu, 1998). This can be
difficult in the hospitality industry because of the intangible services we provide. To deal
with this the industry tries to standardize a lot of its actions in order to provide a
consistent customer experience. This standardization also allows for a consistent image
across different markets the company may be involved in (Jain 1989).
In order to manage the entire system, a franchisor must be able to identify poor
performance on the part of the franchisee (Kaufmann and Eroglu, 1998). Without having
set standards, it would be very difficult to evaluate the franchisees. Research has found in
the restaurant industry, franchised locations are unable to produce consistent quality as
well as company locations do (Michael, 2002). What does this mean for companies inside
of the restaurant industry who are franchising? In order for the company to be successful,
they must be able to coordinate both the franchised and company owned locations
(Michael, 2002). Franchisee compliance with the standardized concept is crucial to the
development and maintenance of the brand image (Kaufmann and Eroglu, 1998).
Kaufmann and Eroglu (1998) stated, “The pursuit of quality control, cost minimization,
and image uniformity though standardization comes with a hidden cost to the system.
Differences in the nature of local demand result in franchisee request for idiosyncratic
adaption in various aspects of the business. Moreover as the system matures, resistance
from experienced franchisees grows and their adaption demands become more
pronounced.” Market differences in things from taste to ethnic variations can reduce the
benefits of standardization (Jain, 1989) For example, if a seafood company form the
Pacific Northwest who specializes in fresh caught salmon tried to open locations in the
south may not be successful. In southern states like Texas, catfish is more readily
available and many more consumers are more acclimated to that taste. They may not be
as accepting of a seafood company not catering to their taste. It is however important to
note that if a product is a part of the brand and is one of its core elements, it cannot be
changed. In Streed and Cliquet (2007) paper they speak to this point. Looking at
McDonalds, they realized that while certain aspect of it menu can be changed in order to
fit with local cultures; i.e. lamb burgers in India; “a ‘Big Mac’ is a ‘Big Mac’ anywhere
in the world with similar ingredients and taste.”
One of the main reasons for standardization across markets is the need to reduce costs
which are gained from economies of scale in purchasing (Kaufmann and Eroglu, 1998).
A company must be able to coordinate or standardize across various activities inside the
company so that these activities can fit together in a consistent pattern (Michael, 2002).
Cost savings through standardization are also realized though standardized inputs.
Franchisees gain a competitive advantage over similar business though these lower cost
of inputs (Kaufmann and Eroglu, 1998).
Kaufmann and Eroglu (1998) also stated, “At the very least, there will be location
differences between [two franchised locations]. It is our contention that as long as the
core elements are sharply defined and uniform across franchisees, peripheral differences
will be discarded along with location, and a consistent and enduring image of the
franchisor’s concept, invariant of time and space will be retained.” To revisit the case of

McDonalds, even though there are differences between the international stores, as long as
the core attributes remain the same, a consistent image is presented to the customer.
Franchised Location vs. Company-Owned Locations
One of the strongest drivers for an entrepreneur to open a franchise location is the ease of
entry (Stanworth and Curran, 1999). This is not to say that the company gains no benefit
from the arrangement. Franchising overcomes the moral hazard problem of site managers
operating within corporate locations (Michael, 2000). Research has identified the
synergistic effects of having both franchised and owned locations (Michael, 2000). In this
portion of the paper we will look at how literature compares these two interests and the
ability to synergize or lack thereof.
Franchisees are more highly motivated to succeed than hired managers (Lafontaine,
1992). Franchisees would also be expected to provide higher quality than a salaried
employee because of residual claim. A franchisee would accept the higher cost of quality
if they were exceeded by gains in unit profits (Michael, 2002). Standard theory says that
franchisees as the residual claimant will induce greater effort and full effort in
supervising (Rubin, 1978). In other words, because the franchisee can maximize their
return by putting more effort into the business, they usually will. Here rest the problem:
franchised locations have shown themselves unable to provide the same level of
consistency as their counterparts, the company locations (Michael, 2002). There are a
plethora of reasons for this discussed in previous research
In the company owned locations, a manager has far less control over the prices, amount
of advertising, and level of acceptable quality. To enforce these goals, the company
monitors each variable and threatens termination to managers who are unable to comply
(Michael, 2002). In franchised locations, the company does not have as much influence.
They are held to what is in the franchise contact and many things are much more loosely
enforced. For example, a company cannot mandate prices on all menu items because of
antitrust laws. Franchisors use an extensive network of field representatives in order to
monitor franchised locations. If they are found to not be upholding the standards of the
brand, they can be terminated (Michael, 2002). The problem is the cost of terminating a
franchisee is much higher than terminating an employee (Michael, 2000).
Brickley and Dark (1987) found that locations closer to corporate head quarters were
more likely to be company owned. Geographic distances increase the cost of monitoring,
so many franchisors sell franchise to distant, overseas, or rural locations while using
employees in urban and suburban locations (Michael, 2000; Kaufmann and Dant, 1996).
In some instances, when the company expands beyond the entrepreneur’s span of control,
the decision to franchise is made.
Average sales of company owned locations are greater than that of their franchised
locations (Lafontaine, 1992). Shelton (1967) found that franchised locations generally
had higher profitability than owned locations in the same chain. This is not in contention
with the findings of Lafontaine as stated earlier. One explanation for this phenomenon is

that sometimes franchised locations are able to cut certain corners (Kaufmann and
Eroglu, 1998) in order to boost profits that company owned locations are not able to do.
In the restaurant industry, quality is shown to be negatively related to the percent of
franchising. Better quality by owned locations may be driven by some aspect of human
resource training or selection that is stricter on employees than on franchisees leading to
better managers (Michael, 2000). Franchise locations may offer enough cost saving in the
form of lower wages for employees to offset the disadvantages of not being able to
coordinate (Michael, 2002). Krueger (1991) found that franchised locations have lower
payroll costs than units managed by employees. Michael (2000) states “…the franchise
system, whatever its other advantages, cannot deliver the same high quality as a totally
owned organization.”
Inspection scores as a determinant of consistency
One area in which a company can effectively manage both its company owned and
franchised locations would be in food safety training. Studies have shown that a
customer’s perception of food safety can be directly related to their willingness to pay
(WTP) (Grunert, 2005). Realizing this fact a company should present a consistent image
of commitment to food safety. If a consumer perceives a restaurant to have either high or
low commitment to food safety, it will affect the restaurants bottom line.
Food Safety score have shown to be a good way to evaluate food safety programs.
Cotterchio et al. found that managers who were required to take a food safety course
showed improvement inspections scores and maintained this improvement over a two
year follow-up period. Those in the control group (not required to take the food safety
training) of this study did not show improvement over time, significantly.
The information that is gained from the inspection scores is not only useful to the
consumer, but to the managers as well. Information from the inspections help managers
develop and evaluate the training program. This cycle is displayed below in figure 1. The
manager and food handlers participate in a food training program, they are inspected by a
local health department, scores are posted, information is taken by both managers and
customers, and customers evaluate their willingness to purchase while manager evaluate
the success of the training program. Lower number of violations can be directly related to
an increase of knowledge gained from food safety training (Campbell et al.)
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Sonic Drive In
In 2001, Sonic Drive In started a program called Sonic Safe. One aspect of the program is
to comply with the Food and Drug administration food code and systems. Sonic has also
tried to raise its standards far above local health departments so that is can roll out a
national safety program that can be consistent. In an interview with Mary Boltz Chapman
from Chain Leader magazine, Mr. Nelson Taylor, senior director of quality assurance and
food safety, said if a franchisee failed a third party audit, Sonic would send field
representatives to review food safety as well as brand elements like service, design and
operations. He stated in the interview the worst case scenario would be legal action
against the franchisee. “The few times it [legal action] has happened, it shows the
company is really serious about this, it’s not a flavor-of-the-day program."
From this interview it is easy to see that Sonic Dive In takes food safety very seriously.
The goal of this research will be to determine if through this program, sonic has been able
to create consistency. We will try to answer the following three questions:
• Has Sonic been able to promote consistency in food safety between its company
owned locations?
• Has Sonic been able to promote consistency in food safety between its franchised
locations?
• Has Sonic been able to promote consistency in food safety between both its
company owned and franchised locations?
In order to compare the locations, this research will use local restaurant inspection scores
as the point of comparison.
METHODOLOGY
Sonic has locations all over the continental United States. In order to make the
undertaking more manageable, this first study will look exclusively inside the state of
Oklahoma. Restaurant safety inspections are conducted locally by the county Health
Department. Restaurants were selected for participation in this study that fit into the
following criteria:
• Were within a county that had at least one of both company owned and franchise
locations.
• Had been inspected during the calendar year of 2009.
• Were within a county that reported to the State Health Department.
These criteria were selected based on:
Were within a county that had at least one of both company owned and franchise
locations. Due to the possibility of differing levels of evaluation varying between
counties, the scores of the restaurants were averaged by county. Each county therefore
had to present a score for both company owned locations and franchised locations.
Had been inspected during the calendar year of 2009. Form the inspection scores, I
was unable to determine how long a restaurant had been in operation or if the restaurant
had since closed. This led us to only evaluate restaurants that had been inspected in 2009.

Were within a county that reported to the State Health Department. The state of
Oklahoma Health Department collects these restaurant inspections and places them in a
central location on their website. Counties that did not report scores to may not be found
to be comparable. There was only one county, Tulsa, that fit into this situation being that
they report their scores on their own website. Tulsa had already been disqualified because
online records had not been updated since 2006.
After evaluating restaurants based on these criteria, there were 112 locations (47
company owned and 65 franchised) stretched over 12 different counties. The number of
each restaurants violations was then tallied during 2009 and averaged with other locations
within that county.
RESULTS
Bellow in table 1, data collected for the twelve counties is displayed. Because completes
its own food inspections and reports to the state, it is not appropriate to compare each
stores score to that of the scores of another county. Instead this study will use the
deviation from the county average to determine consistency. The score is equal to the
number of violations given during the 2009 calendar year.

County
Ca na di a n
Cl ea vel a nd
Creek
Gra dy
Ma yes
McCl a i n
Mus kogee
Okl a homa
Pa wnee
Pa yne
Potta wa tomi e
Wa goner

# of CO
Stores

Tota l CO
Scores
1
6
2
1
1
1
3
27
1
1
1
2

0.00
94.00
5.00
8.00
16.00
14.00
13.00
133.00
3.00
6.00
12.00
12.00

CO
Avera ge
0.00
15.67
2.50
8.00
16.00
14.00
4.33
4.93
3.00
6.00
12.00
6.00

# of FR
Stores

Tota l FR
Scores
3
5
1
1
3
3
2
35
1
3
6
2

8.00
106.00
7.00
6.00
34.00
58.00
8.00
142.00
2.00
14.00
27.00
20.00

FR
Avera ge
2.67
21.20
7.00
6.00
11.33
19.33
4.00
4.06
2.00
4.67
4.50
10.00

County
a vera ge
2.00
18.18
4.00
7.00
12.50
18.00
4.20
4.44
2.50
5.00
5.57
8.00

Table 2 presents a consistency score derived from taking the absolute value of the
average of the country of both company owned and franchised locations minus the
average of the company owned locations. The range in the consistency score for company
owned locations is 6.30. The consistency score does not measure against consistency with
sonic standards, but consistency among the other company owned stores.
Table 3 also produces a consistency score for franchised locations. It is derived by taking
the absolute value of the average of the country of both company owned and franchised
locations minus the average of the franchised locations. The range in the consistency
score for franchised locations is 2.82.

Table 2

County
Mus kogee
Okl a homa
Pawnee
Gra dy
Payne
Creek
Wa goner
Cana di an
Cl eavel a nd
Ma yes
McCl ai n
Potta watomi e

Table 3
CO
Avera ge

County
a verage

4.33
4.93
3.00
8.00
6.00
2.50
6.00
0.00
15.67
16.00
14.00
12.00

Cons i s tency
s core

4.20
4.44
2.50
7.00
5.00
4.00
8.00
2.00
18.18
12.50
18.00
5.57

County

0.13
0.49
0.50
1.00
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.00
2.52
3.50
4.00
6.43

Mus kogee
Payne
Okl ahoma
Pawnee
Cana di an
Gra dy
Potta wa tomi e
Ma yes
McCl a i n
Wa goner
Creek
Cl eavel and

FR
Average
4.00
4.67
4.06
2.00
2.67
6.00
4.50
11.33
19.33
10.00
7.00
21.20

County
average
4.20
5.00
4.44
2.50
2.00
7.00
5.57
12.50
18.00
8.00
4.00
18.18

Cons i s tency
Scores
0.20
0.33
0.38
0.50
0.67
1.00
1.07
1.17
1.33
2.00
3.00
3.02

Below table 4 sought to discover if consistency could was evident within each of the
counties. The consistency score was calculated by taking the difference between the
percentages of violations for both company owned and franchised locations. Range is not
relevant because there was no comparison made across counties.

Table 4

County
Okl a homa
Cl e a vel a nd
Gra dy
Cre ek
Pa wnee
Mus koge e
Wa gone r
Ma ye s
Potta wa tomi e
Pa yne
McCl a i n
Ca na di a n

CO %

FR %
48%
47%
57%
42%
60%
62%
38%
32%
31%
30%
19%
0%

52%
53%
43%
58%
40%
38%
63%
68%
69%
70%
81%
100%

Cons i s tency
Score
0.03
0.06
0.14
0.17
0.20
0.24
0.25
0.36
0.38
0.40
0.61
1.00

Discussion
In table 2, we are looking to answer the first research question, “Has Sonic been able to
promote consistency in food safety between its company owned locations?” With the data
gained from the study we are unable to answer this question in a yes or no fashion. Sonic
Drive In does not an acceptable number of violations that we were able to find through
this study. Without a standard number of violations to compare our findings to, we are

only able to give a level of consistency. This is also true with the second research
question, “Has Sonic been able to promote consistency in food safety between its
franchised locations?” What the data has shown us is that the range of consistency scores
for franchised locations is smaller than that of consistency scores for company owned
locations.
Consistency scores are not to be confused with the actual number of violations given
during the 2009 calendar year. In truth, move violations were given to franchised
locations than to company owned locations. The consistency score only consistency
between the locations.
The last of the research questions asked, “Has Sonic been able to promote consistency in
food safety between both its company owned and franchised locations?” In this question
we looked to see if geographical areas were able to promote consistency between both
franchised and company owned locations. From data in Table 4 we were able to rank the
order of most consistent counties to least consistent. It is interesting to note that
Oklahoma Country, where the headquarters office is housed, was the most consistent of
the twelve counties and that the second and third most consistent counties border
Oklahoma county.
Limitations
The biggest limitation of this study was the geographical scope. By only looking inside of
the state of Oklahoma we were limited in proximal factors, sample size, and food safety
evaluation practices. This study showed even on a small scale that proximity to a
headquarter office may play a role in consistency, but need to be evaluated in further
research for validity.
Another limitation goes to the food safety violation itself. In this study we did not
differentiate between the varying levels of violations. To that fact, foodborne outbreaks
may have been compared to lesser offenses such as cleanliness. In future research the
varying levels should be taken into account to note whether there are varying levels of
consistency and if the company such as Sonic Dive In is able to control these more sever
violations.
Conclusion
Though the data gained from this study was unable to completely answer the research
questions posed, it was however able to give pertinent information that can lead to other
studies. Future research in this area can lead to better controls for corporations and how
they continue the relationship between company owned and franchised locations. I feel it
is important to reiterate the point that the data presented here does not answer the
question, “Is Sonic Drive In able to keep locations, company owned and franchised,
consistent with its standards?” To answer this question, a comprehensive study of Sonic
Drive In’s food safety standards must be conducted. This study only highlighted
consistency between locations and counties.
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